Monday, August 23, 2010

rsyslog queues, reliability and forwarding

I would like to explain a little bit how rsyslog queues and forwarding interact. First of all, let me state that the queue engine and the action part of rsyslog, where the forwarding happens, are strictly separated. There is no interface between the two that permits an action to affect queue behaviour. For example, I was asked if a forwarding action could initiate disk queue mode when the forwarding fails. The root reason for this was that messages should not be endagered while a remote server fails.

This is not possible with the current design and involves a far-from-trivial design change. However, I do not think that the functionality is actually needed. When talking about reliablity, rsyslog works on the importance of messages and not on the importance of actions.

So in rsyslog we can configure the level of message loss that is acceptable for a given use case. This can be done on an action-by-action basis (or once at the ruleset/main queue level for all actions -- usually not a good idea, but from time to time it may be). The extreme ends are a) no message loss at all permited and b) message loss of any magnitude is acceptable. For a), this means we need to configure a disk-only queue with full sync of queue files and management information after each message processed (with message input batches of one). For b), this means we do not need to place any restrictions. Obviously, a) is rather slow while b) is extremely fast. As extremes are not usually what is needed, there are many configuration possibilities between these two extremes. For example, one may define a queue the goes to disk if more than 1,000 messages are kept in main memory, but only then, and that fsyncs queue files every 10 messages (a big performance saver). That means that at any instant, at most 1,010 messages are at risk and can potentially be lost. The queue than monitors these predicates and switches to disk mode only when required. This is a very big performance saver.

Now let's switch a bit the perception of things: Let's go with our starting example and say you want to go to disk only when the remote system is down. But what if the remote system is up, but can not accept messages quickly enough. Let's assume a backlog of 10,000 messages builds up. Is it then acceptable to keep these in main memory, just because the remote system is accepting data? If this risk is acceptable, why would it be inacceptable if the remote system is not yet accessible. If we say one case is acceptable but the other not, we somewhat contradict ourselves: it is almost random if the remote system is accepting messages, so why does it make a difference in the risk we permit?

This contradiction is the core reason why rsyslog does not look at external events or action failure causes but rather works on the basis of "acceptable risk". Let's say it is acceptable to lose 1,000 messages. Then, it is irrelevant if we lose these while the remote system is accepting or not. Consequently, rsyslog enforces disk mode if the remote system is down and there are more than 1,000 messages inside the queue. But it does not enforce this if there are only 500 messages waiting to be sent? Why should it? After all, the user has specified that a loss of 1,000 messages is acceptable, and so we do not try to guard these messages more than required by this policy. Note, of course, that if rsyslog is terminated in such a situation, of course a disk queue with 500 messages is created. We do not voluntarily lose messages, and if we terminate, we can no longer hold them in main memory. Consequently, they must be written out (of course, again depending on configuration). So the in-memory queue is retained across rsyslog restarts. But it is important to point out that unexected aborts - like sudden loss of power - can cause message loss in such scenarios. This is no different from sudden loss of power with an accepting remote system and a queue of 500. If such a risk is unaccetable, we have what I initially described in scenario a).

As a side note, rsyslog queues provide very high reliability. Every message is removed from the queue only after the action acknowledges that it has been processed. This kind of reliablity is used in some very demanding audit-grade environments (which I, as usally, not permitted to name...).

To sum up, rsyslog protects message integrity not be external events but by user-configurable "acceptable risk" policies.

We consider this a superior approach, as external events are somewhat unreliable when it comes to protecting traffic bursts. Relying on external events has a number of anomalies, as hopefully explained above.

Wednesday, August 11, 2010

getting serious with rsyslog v6

I have just created a new v5-devel branch based on the current master AND have then merged the newconf branch into master. This "officially" means the beginning of rsyslog v6. So I thought that justifies a short blog post.

As already elaborated, v6 will focus on a better configuration language. The current version already has scoping for actions, but no doc yet for it. I will try to add the doc, so that I can hopefully officially release the devel version this week. I'd also like to work a bit more on imptcp, so that I have some common base functionalty in all versions that support it.

Thursday, August 05, 2010

Starting new v5-beta branch

I will start a new v5-beta branch soon. I have seen that a number of things have been changed since the last stable release. Most importantly, some of these changes fix bugs. Bug, that are hard to fix in the current stable version. This is because v5 got not so much exposed to reality, but adoption rate seems to increase and so we have been able to iron out some issues while doing refactoring on the latest development release.

I have thought about backporting the bug fixes. However, this doesn't seem to make too much sense: it is a lot of work, and, when done the current v5-stable will have code very close to the development branch. So I decided to accept the bugs for the time being and instead see the we can get a new 4.6.0 stable release as soon as possible. The first step on that route is to create a new beta. Based on past experience, I think we can promote that the stable in September (as we already got some good feedback on it).

Anybody with problems in the current v5-stable should simply update to the beta as soon as it is available.

Busy at the moment...

Some might have noticed that I am not as active as usual on the rsyslog project . As this seems to turn out to keep at least for the upcomi...